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egarding the rules of warfare, whether we think of Hugo Grotius (De Jure
Belli ac Pacis),l Oppenheim (International Law: A Treatise)' or Tolstoy
(War and Peace) ,' we look back at an earlier age. A hundred years ago, there was
war and there was peace. Each was dearly identifiable and subject to its own rules.
To codify one area, in 1907, the Hague Peace Conference agreed upon a Convention on the Opening of Hostilities (Hague Convention IIJ).' For centuries, there
had been customary rules dealing with armistices, capitulation, surrender and the
restoration of peace. The laws of war were applicable in the period between the
opening of hostilities and the restoration of peace.
The middle of the twentieth century began to place this system under strain.
States had sought to avoid the application of the laws of war by denying that hostilities amounted to a "war" within the legal definition. The Geneva Conventions of
1949' attempted to resolve this problem by changing the application threshold
from "war," with its legal technicalities, to «armed conflict," a factual assessment.
The spotlight turned from the initial threshold to a new problem. Whereas "war"
had always been looked upon as the use of force between States, the nature of
armed conflict was different. No longer did States hold a monopoly of violence.
The end of colonialism and the Cold War led to war by proxy, often fought between armed groups within a State fighting for control of that State. Sometimes,
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one group represented the recognized government fighting an insurgency; in other
cases. the fight was between groups and each might have recognition from States
on different sides of the ideological divide. The laws of war. or as they were now
known. the laws of armed conflict. were still primarily a matter of treaty law. applicable only to wars between States. now called international armed conflicts. Only
limited provisions applied to these new internal armed conflicts. now referred to as
non-international armed conflicts. The key issues became. on the one hand. defining
the distinction between international and non-international armed conflict and. on
the other hand. working on extending the rules applicable to non-international
armed conflict.
However. in recent years. the initial threshold of armed conflict has again become relevant. This has been caused to some extent by the success of those who
have sought. for humanitarian reasons. to merge the rules relating to international
and non-international armed conflict. but also by politicians. who have sought to
take advantage of the greater freedom of action normally granted to States in time
of war by seeking to apply the laws of war in areas beyond their traditional field.
The tensions have led to a debate that has suffered from a seeming inability by different sides to understand where others are coming from. It has become multifaceted and in some cases issues have been lost in confusion over vocabulary. This
article will seek to look at how the problems have arisen and whether there is still
room for a comprehensive approach that will accommodate to some extent all the
competing factions.
In order to find a solution. it is first necessary to identify the problem and how it
has arisen. As it has arisen from two separate confrontations. this is more complicated than usual; however. the attempt must be made. First. let us look at the legal
arguments that have led to the increasing merger of the law relating to international and non-international armed conflict.
As we have seen. this first arose as an issue after the Second World War. Until
that time. the use of violence was seen as the monopoly of States. Similarly. internationallaw involved States and not. for the most part. private individuals. The laws
of war therefore dealt with wars between States and what went on within the
boundaries of a State was for that State alone and not a matter for the international
community. This is to some extent reflected even in the United Nations Charter.
where Article 2(7) states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
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Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures
under Chapter VI!.6

Sovereignty continued to rule but the first chink in the impregnability of the State
sovereignty doctrine could be seen here. Even sovereignty could not act as a shield
against action by the Security Council, acting on behalf of the international community, when using its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter.
The lessons of the Second World War had shown quite clearly that States could
no longer, if they ever could, be trusted entirely to protect their own citizens. The
Holocaust was the ultimate betrayal of the duty to protect. While Article 2(7) created a small opportunity for intervention, lawyers were also working to see if the
laws protecting peoples could also be strengthened. This work was in two strands.
On the one hand, the International Committee of the Red Cross (lCRC), working
on revisions of the law protecting victims of war, saw the need to extend that protection down into non-international armed conJlicts. At the same time, the United
Nations, reluctant as an organization pledged to the abolition of war to involve itself in revision of the laws of war, sought to develop a new branch of international
law designed to protect the individual from the powers of the State. Thus human
rights law, conceived in the cauldron of two world wars, was developed separately
from the laws of war and seen, in essence, as part of the law of peace. It is the separate but contemporaneous development of these two powerful branches of international law that has contributed both to the increased legal protection available to
individual victims of armed conflict, and also to a growing overlap between the
laws of war and the laws of peace. That overlap has, for the most part, been mutually beneficial, but as the laws of war and human rights law have expanded into
each other's "territory,· tensions have occurred. These tensions may not be immediately apparent and indeed for many years have lain comparatively unexposed,
but recent political events, particularly "9/ 11· and the subsequent "war on terror,·
have exposed these tensions to view. Some still refuse to accept that the tensions exist, but 1 would suggest that if we are to bring these two branches into coexistence,
then the tensions must be faced and dealt with.
First we need to see how the tensions have developed.
The ICRC had already been seeking to strengthen the laws relating to victims of
armed conflict prior to the Second World War. As a result, it was well placed to
make progress in developing "Geneva· law and gained the international community's agreement to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.' These are often seen as
the bedrock of modern international humanitarian law, but, again, they approached matters essentially from the viewpoint of the protection of victims. However, the ICRC failed in one ofits major objectives. The lCRC had recognized that
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the nature of warfare was changing and that States no longer had a monopoly on
the use of force. As a result, in 1949 it had initially sought to apply the full weight of
"Geneva" law, as embodied in the four 1949 Conventions, to non-international
armed conflict. The JCRC failed. States were not prepared to go that far in allowing
international supervision of their internal affairs. The result was that only One article,
common to all four of the 1949 Conventions, was applied to non-international
armed conflict. Significantly, the wording of Common Article 3,' as it is called, is
very similar to the wording used in human rights law. However, the law relating to
the conduct of hostilities remained frozen in the form that it had adopted in 1907
in the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to
Hague Convention IV.' The Regulations had, however, been strengthened by the
pronouncement of the Nuremberg Tribunal that they nOW reflected customary internationallaw and were thus binding on all States. I.
At the same time, the United Nations was drafting and promulgating the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Human rights law, however, initially
developed slowly. The two international covenants on economic, social and cultural rights 12 and civil and political rights" were not adopted until 1966. In the
meantime, Europe had adopted its own Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights in 1950, which came into force in 1953. 14 Where this Convention was particularly significant was that it had a judicial enforcement mechanism in the form
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) , a Court that has increasingly
taken a proactive line in terms of interpreting and enforcing the European
Convention.
Although the Universal Declaration was seen as part of the law of peace, the European Convention's terms provided for its continued applicability in times of
war. Its derogation clause specifically referred to "war or other public emergency
threatening the life of the nation."15lt was difficult, therefore, to argue that human
rights played no part in governing conduct in time of war, at least for European
States. Nevertheless, it was generally accepted that in time of"war"-armed conflict
between States--it was the laws of war that took priority. The position was less clear
in non-international armed conflict, where the law of armed conflict was still only in
rudimentary form. While Common Article 3 clearly applied to non-international
armed conflict, the application of "Hague" law On the conduct of hostilities was
much more problematic. The Hague treaties almost exclusively dealt only with
international armed conflict between States and few, if any, commentators were
prepared to argue that as a matter of custom, such law extended into noninternational armed conflict. States still considered that sovereignty was an overriding consideration and they were not prepared to allow international law to
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govern how they conducted operations against rebel forces on their own territories. But human rights law was already beginning to do just that.
In 1974, the ICRC again attempted to extend the ambit of the law of armed conflict. It prepared two draft protocols for consideration by States. There were two
notable features to these drafts. First, the text was dearly heavily influenced by human
rights law. Second, the text not only dealt with "Geneva" law, the traditional area in
which the ICRC had operated, but also contained substantial elements of "Hague"
law dealing with the conduct of hostilities. The two draft protocols dealt respectively with international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict.
These drafts were considered by a diplomatic conference convened by the Swiss
government between 1974 and 1977 before two texts were adopted in lune 1977."
The original draft texts had again sought to bring together the law relating to the
two distinct types of conflict, but at the last minute the text of Additional Protocol
II relating to non-international armed conflict was substantially trimmed. States
again were cautious about allowing too much international control over internal
matters. What remained was almost entirely "Geneva" law, expanding the minimal
provisions contained in Common Artide 3. Furthermore, although Common Artide 3 had no "threshold of violence" and thus applied to any "armed conflict not
of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,"" Additional Protocol II had a much higher threshold, applying only
to non-international armed conflicts taking place
in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident
armed forces or other organised armed groups which, under responsible command.
exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained
and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol 18

Thus "Hague" law still was seen as having a minimal impact on non-international
armed conflicts.
All this was to change in the 1990s. The conflicts caused by the breakup of the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were both bitter and complex- Neighbor
was pitted against neighbor and it was often difficult to assess the legal context in
which atrocities were being committed. The United Nations Security Council
established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and
passed the problem from the political to the judicial arena.
The Yugoslav Tribunal found itself in something of a quandary. The characterization of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia was not without considerable
doubt. Were they international, that is, between the new States, or internal, between ethnic groups within the new States? Indeed, did the nature of the conflicts
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change at various points and, if so, when? The rules on the conduct ofinternational
hostilities were comparatively clear following the adoption in 1977 of Additional
Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 2o Although this treaty did not have the
universal acceptance of the Geneva Conventions themselves, its key provisions, in·
cluding proportionality and precautions in attack, were accepted as custom even
by those States who, as a result of objections to other provisions, had not ratified it.
But what was the situation in non-international armed conflict? In the early 1990s,
even the ICRC had considered that the concept of war crimes in non-international
armed conflict did not exist," those being matters within the jurisdiction of the domestic courts as crimes under the States' domestic laws. While this orthodoxy had
been turned on its head by the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda," Rwanda quite clearly being a non-international armed conflict,
there remained doubts as to how far the law could extend. As we have seen, treaty
law in relation to non-international armed conflict was almost entirely based on
"Geneva" law concepts. But here we had conflicts fought with a ferocity that certainly equated to that found in international armed conflicts. To what extent were
the participants bound by "Hague" law on the conduct of hostilities?
The Yugoslav Tribunal met this challenge head-on in its first case, that of Dusko
Tadic.23 While the Tribunal was not prepared to go as far as some wanted and declare a total assimilation of the law in international and non-international armed
conflicts, it stated that "a number of rules and principles ... have gradually been extended to apply to internal conflicts." However, it put down an important caveat
that "this extension has not taken place in the form of a full and mechanical transplant of those rules to internal conflict; rather, the general essence of those rules,
and not the detailed regulation they may contain, has become applicable to internal conflicts."24 While the judgment itself may have been understandably cautious,
it opened Pandora's box. Within a very short period, the caveat seemed to have
been forgotten.
In 1998, the Statute of the International Criminal Court followed the Tadic decision by transposing some of the war crimes applicable in international armed
conflict into non-international armed conflict." While most were still of the
"Geneva" law type, some were clearly "Hague" law, including pillage and directing attacks against protected persons and objects. The Secretary-General's
Bulletin on observance by United Nations forces ofinternational humanitarian
law of 6 August 199926 drew no distinction between international and noninternational armed conflict and the seminal ICRC study Customary International
Humanitarian Law," while identifying 161 "Rules" of customary international
humanitarian law, found that no fewer than 147 applied across the board in both
international and non-international armed conflicts." Furthermore, the study
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drew no distinction between high-intensity non-international armed conflicts,
those covered by Additional ProtocollJ, and those of a lower intensity, subject in
treaty law only to the provisions of Common Article 3. The clear conclusion was
that, subject to those areas where there were obvious distinctions (e.g., status of
prisoners of war), the rules, particularly those relating to the conduct ofhostilities, were the same. The unwillingness of States to accept such conclusions in
1949 or more recently in 1977 was thus overcome by a combination of judicial
activism and interpretation of customary law.
But if the conduct of hostilities in non-international armed conflicts is now governed by the rules of international humanitarian law, where does that leave human
rights law? Under international humanitarian law, it is recognized that in war people die and things get broken. Even a degree of innocent death is acceptable if it is
counterbalanced by military advantage. This would seem to fly in the face of human
rights law with its more hardened attitude based on the rights of the victim. As international humanitarian law sought wider applicability in non-international
armed conflict, it was inevitable that it would collide with human rights law as that
too sought to protect the victims of conflicts of all types.
While other bodies have also played a part, the ECtHR has been at the forefront
of this confrontation. Cases were referred to the Court arising out of the "Troubles" in Northern Ireland and, as the United Kingdom never acknowledged that
these ever reached the level of an "armed conflict," it was no surprise that the Court
dealt with the cases purely on the basis of human rights law with no reference to international humanitarian law." Slightly more problematic were cases arising out
of the Kurdish insurgency in eastern Turkey. Again, the Court dealt with these entirely on the basis of human rights law, seemingly reluctant even to acknowledge
any application of international humanitarian law." The Court was also called
upon in cases arising from the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the subsequent occupation, an international armed conflict. The signs of a disagreement
between the two bodies of law were apparent when the Court was asked to deal
with issues arising from the detention of prisoners of war. These cases were also
dealt with solely on the basis of human rights law." In the light of Article 5 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, which, unlike the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, contains an exclusive list of the
grounds for deprivation ofliberty,32 it is hard to see how the detention of prisoners
of war can be lawful under the European Convention unless a State derogates from
the Convention. No State has sought to do so in relation to an armed conflict outside its own territory.
Insofar as the conduct of hostilities is concerned, the Court first became involved in the Bankovic case," involving the bombing by NATO forces of a Serbian
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television station during the Kosovo air campaign, again an international armed
conflict. The case was brought by some of those injured in the attack and by families of those killed. Had the Court reached a decision on the merits, a number of
crucial questions involving international humanitarian law would seemingly have
become relevant. Was the 1V station a military objective? If so, how should the anticipated military advantage be assessed and what was the expected incidental loss
or damage? How is this balance to be calculated? How does all of this fit with the
right to life under human rights law? There was no derogation under Article 15 of
the Convention" and so to what extent could the Court take into account
international humanitarian law at all? Should the Court deal with the matter
solely as a human rights issue without any reference to international humanitarian
law? Much to the relief of many, but the chagrin of some academics, the Court decided on a preliminary issue that the victims ofsuch an air attack did not fall within
the "jurisdiction" of the Court.
However, this was not the end of the matter. This was an international armed
conflict and it was clear that NATO had no control over the ground. Furthermore,
the territory involved, Serbia, was not within the "espace juridique" of the European Convention. The armed conflict in Chechnya provided a different scenario, a
non-international armed conflict on the territory of a State party to the Convention. Here the jurisdictional arguments that had prevented the Court from adjudicating the Bankovic case did not apply. The Court therefore had to bite the bullet.
This conflict involved both land and air operations and it was not long before a case
involving the conduct of hostilities came before the Court.
The case involved the bombing from the air of what turned out to be a civilian
convoy of vehicles fleeing Grozny.35 It hinged therefore, in international humanitarian law terms, on the issue of precautions in attack. The Court, however, dealt
with it entirely in human rights terms, although international humanitarian law
had been discussed in arguments before the Court. As it happens, the facts were
such that the same result would probably have been reached under either system of
law and the Court used language very similar to that contained in international humanitarian law, particularly Additional Protocol I. However, the Court, on the
facts, was able to evade some of the key issues, including that of proportionality.
Had the convoy turned out to be a military objective, perhaps because of a number
of military vehicles embedded in the convoy, would the issue of proportionality
have been dealt with differently under human rights law and the right to life rather
than under humanitarian law, where a certain measure of incidental loss and damage is acceptable? The tectonic plates were beginning to rub together.
The legal uncertainty has been accompanied by political events to create "the
perfect storm." When the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was once asked
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what he feared most, he is alleged to have replied, "Events, dear boy, events."'· The

9111 attacks were certainly such an event. Prior to that date, terrorism was, of
course, already a recognized phenomenon; however, it was considered to be on the
"peace" side of the line and to be a matter for law enforcement authorities. The series of United Nations conventions on terrorism drafted during the 1970s, '80s
and '90s in response largely to acts carried out by Palestinian groups concentrated
on international criminal law cooperation." It was acknowledged that terrorism
could take place within armed conflict and "acts of terrorism" were specifically
prohibited under Additional protocol II." States, for the most part, sought to differentiate between "terrorism" and armed contlict. On the one hand, Arah groups
refused to acknowledge that acts carried out by Palestinian factions were "acts of
terrorism" at all, but rather insisted they were legitimate acts of resistance." Conversely, the United Kingdom consistently refused to accept that the campaign by
the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and other Republican factions in Northern Ireland amounted to armed contlict. Even the deployment of large numbers of British military forces did not change that position. They were deployed in the capacity
of military aid to the civil power,'o were subject to civilian control and were at all
times subject to domestic law. Thus, insofar as the use of force was concerned, they
operated in a law enforcement paradigm, not in an armed conflict one. This led to
soldiers being investigated for-and even charged with-murder where, under an
armed conflict paradigm, their use of force might have been entirely justified."
The United Kingdom, when ratifying Additional Protocol I in 1998, made a specific statement of understanding in the following terms: "It is the understanding of
the United Kingdom that the term 'armed contlict' of itself and in its context denotes a situation of a kind which is not constituted by the commission of ordinary
crimes including acts of terrorism whether concerted or in isolation."42
It should be pointed out that the United States seems to have adopted a similar
position. As late as April 17, 2000, Madeleine Albright, then Secretary of State, said
in a speech to the University of World Economy and Diplomacy at Tashkent in
Uzbekistan:
Terrorism is a criminal act and should be treated accordingly-and that means applying the law fairly and consistently. We have found, through experience around the
world. that the best way to defeat terrorist threats is to increase law enforcement capabilities while at the same time promoting democracy and hwnan rights:o

The events of9111 were to change all that. While the world accepted that the attacks
of that day on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon amounted to an "armed attack" sufficient to bring Article 51 of the UN Charter into play," the legal categorization of
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what happened next was highly controversiaL Most accepted that the subsequent
attacks on Taliban forces in Afghanistan amounted to an international armed conflict between members of the coalition, most prominently the United States, and
Afghanistan; however, that was where consensus seemed to stop. After much internal argument,45 President Bush decided that there were two separate armed conflicts,
one against the Taliban in Afghanistan to which the laws of war applied and another against AI Qaeda, the latter creating a "new paradigm" outside the existing
laws of war."" The "war on terror" had begun.
I am well aware that the phraseology has now changed. The U.S. administration
appears now to have abandoned the concept of a "war on terror" under pressure
from the Supreme Court, but the consequences of that initial categorization live
with us still. Although the "war" is now stated to be an "overseas contingency operation" against AI Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups, to some extent nothing has
changed. "AI Qaeda and affiliated forces" is a phrase that is remarkably difficult to
define to any degree of certainty. AI Qaeda itself has become like a chameleon,
changing its shape as circumstances change. It would seem that almost any terrorist
group whose aim is to destroy or damage the United States could be brought within
the definition on the basis that "my enemy's friend is my enemy." While the current administration does not like it to be stated as bluntly, the United States seems
to reserve the right to apply the laws of war to operations against "terrorists"-as
defined by the United States-anywhere in the world. The argument is that this is
self-defense and the right would only be exercised where the territorial State is unwilling or unable to take action itself. This has applied in both Yemen and Pakistan,
though certainly in the case of the former there may have been a degree of consent
from the local authorities. It is perhaps ironic that when Israel sought to exercise a
similar right in the Entebbe raid, this was condemned by the international community and even by the Secretary-General of the United Nations."
There is no doubt, as we have already seen, that terrorism can take place in
armed conflict. What we are now seeing, however, is an increasing tendency to label

all dissidents as «terrorists') and, as such, "unlawful combatants" in order to take
advantage of the looser controls on the use of force under the laws of armed conflict. Furthermore, the increasing restrictions imposed by human rights law on the
right to detain and try individuals under the law enforcement paradigm have increased the temptation to rely on emergency detention provisions, allegedly based
on the laws of armed conflict. As we have also seen, the United States appears to assert that in this area at least, the laws of armed conflict displace human rights law so
that human rights bodies and even domestic courts have little or no influence."
Faced with this dichotomy, intensive efforts have been made to justify the actions of the two successive administrations. One is reminded of the old Irish story
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where the lost traveler seeking directions to Mullingar was advised, "If I was you,
sir, I would not start from here!" An admission that the original decision, to declare
a 'war on terror" and invoke the laws of armed conflict as the authority for acts by
the President in his capacity as Commander in Chief, was wrong would have incalculable consequences. It could lay the United States open to lawsuits from hundreds, if
not thousands, of"victims." It could also have political consequences that would
go beyond the issue of terrorism. An attempt, therefore, has been made to alter the
direction of travel without making any concessions on the rightness or wrongness
of the original course (though comments may be made as to its advisability). In
some ways, it is like trying to tum around a supertanker-it cannot simply be
thrust into reverse.
Lawyers and scholars in the United States have approached this problem from
different angles. Some have castigated the successive administrations for riding
roughshod over legal traditions and have effectively demanded that the ship be
slammed into reverse." While, in an ideal world, this might be advisable, it is probably impracticable in the political sense. Others have backed the extreme line taken
in the early days and see any withdrawal from the original position as a weakening
of U.S. resolve and as a triumph for the powers of evil.50 This does not help the position of the United States in the rest of the world.
A third school is made up of what I will call "the pragmatists." Here are people
who recognize the underlying principles oflaw and are keen to present the United
States as a country steeped in the legal tradition and merely seeking to respond to
new circumstances within the existing framework of international law. As such,
they seek to find innovative ways of justifying U.S. positions without undermining
international law as it is understood and accepted by the rest of the world. Examples of this particular school can be found in some of the pronouncements of the
Supreme Court, anxious not to appear to impinge upon the President's authority
under the separation of powers. The clearest of these is that in Hamdan where the
Court found that persons held in detention were, at least, subject to the protections
given under Common Article 3." This was immediately seized upon by many as a
statement by the Court that the ' war against AI Qaeda" was a non-international
armed conflict." However, with respect, the Court did not answer the fundamental question-whether there was a 'war" at all. The Court felt that this fell within
the jurisdiction of others to decide and, therefore, for the purposes of its ruling, it
accepted that there was such a "war." Others in this volume will deal in greater
depth with this and other Supreme Court decisions."
I also place within this school the writings of Professor Geoffrey Corn, also featured in this volume. 54 Professor Corn has long argued most eloquently for a new
category of conflict, "transnational armed conflicts," to reflect the nature of a
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conflict against a non-State actor with global operations and reach." In one way he
is right in that few non-international armed conflicts have been confined operationallywithin the borders ofa single State. Most have had a transnational element,
even if only by dissidents using a porous border to seek protection. In most of these
cases, however, a distinction has been drawn between operations within the territory of the State involved in the non-international armed conflict and those outside. Nobody, for example, among those who argued that Northern Ireland was a
non-international armed conflict would have alleged that this gave the United
Kingdom the right to strike targets in Boston where IRA leaders were regular
speakers at fund-raising rallies, or even in Libya, from where much of the Semtex
used by the IRA came and which was a major player in both training and funding.
Professor Corn seems to argue that once military forces are used, it should be
the laws of war that apply. This is, of course, in line with accepted Department of
Defense policy," but I would suggest is based on a somewhat U.S.-centric view of
the use of military force cultured to a considerable extent by the Posse Comitatus
Act." Other jurisdictions do not have the same restrictions on the use of military
force for domestic law enforcement purposes. As already stated, the United Kingdom for decades relied upon military forces to support the Royal Ulster Constabulary in Northern Ireland, relying completely on a law enforcement paradigm.58
Although it must be admitted that, to a certain extent, this was a political decision,
it does not take away from the fact that the UK armed forces were perfectly capable
of acting within the constraints of a law enforcement mode. Indeed, it could be argued that the refusal by the UK government to "escalate" the conflict eventually led
to the decision by the IRA leadership to enter into the political arena and seek to
obtain its political aims through the ballot box rather than the bullet.
Perhaps a more striking example of this ability of UK armed forces to operate in
a law enforcement paradigm can be found in the Iranian Embassy siege of 1980.59
Terrorists seized the Iranian Embassy in London and took a large number of hostages, including Iranian and British staff. Negotiations with the terrorists were conducted by the Metropolitan Police as the lead agency, but a squadron of Special Air
Service (SAS) soldiers was put on immediate standby and deployed to London.
Once negotiations broke down and a hostage was killed, the SAS soldiers stormed
the building, killing five terrorists, capturing one and rescuing all the surviving
hostages. In some ways, this is comparable to the attack on the Bin Laden
compound.
Despite the intensity of the siege operation, this was treated throughout as a law
enforcement operation. There was an inquest into the deaths of each of those
killed-hostages and terrorists alike-and the surviving terrorist was tried (and
duly convicted) at the Central Criminal Court in London ("The Old Bailey").
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While the deaths of the hostages were dearly unlawful killing, each of the deaths of
the terrorists had to be justified under a law enforcement paradigm. It was not sufficient to say, "I saw this guy and I shot him!" The inquest was held in public, but it
was hardly difficult in the circumstances to satisfy the coroner that these deaths
were lawful. The soldiers involved did not hesitate to fire when appropriate, but at
the same time were perfectly capable of restraint when appropriate as well. This
controlled use oflethal force is an essential part of training and, even in a situation
governed by the laws of armed conflict, would be necessary to reduce the risk of
collateral damage. I would therefore challenge those who maintain that the use of
military force must inevitably require the application of the laws of armed conflict.
Indeed, it could be argued that the use of restrained force, as under the law enforcement paradigm, may be more appropriate in some armed conflict situations where
it is difficult to distinguish between fighters and civilians not taking a direct part in
hostilities.
I would also note here the attempts by government lawyers, under both the
Bush and Obama administrations, to fmd legal justifications for U.S. actions. It is
not the case, despite the views of some right-wing commentators, that the United
States does not consider itself bound by international law, or, as John Bolton, the
former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, would see it, there is no law superior to the U.S. Constitution.'" Successive administrations, while accepting the inadequacies of international law in some respects, have sought to place themselves
within the framework of that law. This is particularly true of the excellent lawyers
in the State Department. Whether officially or in their private capacities, they have
sought to uphold the integrity of international law without seeking to undermine
their political masters.
Again an example is to be found with the arguments of Karl Chang on new uses
of the principle of neutrality."' While there may be disagreement with his attempts
to introduce the concept of neutrality into non-international armed conflict, it is at
least an acceptance of the need to justify actions under international law. Neutrality has indeed been relevant in the past in high-intensity non-international armed
conflict, but this has been linked to another doctrine, recognition of belligerency,
which traditionally has internationalized a non-international armed conflict,
introducing the legal regime applicable to international armed conflict. This doctrine too appears to be making a comeback in some circles after decades in the legal
wilderness .•2
The danger of all this debate is that developments in intemationallaw will be
seen to be being driven by the domestic law requirements of a single State. However powerful that State may be, international law remains the "law of nations"-
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plural-and while it is inevitable that some States will be more influential than others, one State alone should not be in a position to set the rules for all.
The confusion on the borders between law enforcement and armed conflict can
be seen clearly in the events of the Arab Spring in 2011. The first two major States
affected were Egypt and Tunisia. In both cases, mass demonstrations toppled the
regime in power. In Egypt, the military took over the control of the demonstrations from the police and, indeed, on the fall of the Mubarak regime took over
power itself. Despite the deployment of military forces and the existence of what
social scientists would undoubtedly describe as a "conflict,"·' few would argue
that the confrontations reached the level necessary to constitute an "armed conflict" sufficient to invoke the laws of armed conflict. The Egyptian military was
thus judged in its actions under a law enforcement paradigm.
On the other hand, Libya clearly crossed the threshold of armed conflict even
before the NATO operations conducted under the authority of UN Security
Council Resolution 1973.64 But what of Syria and Yemen? At the time of this writing (October 2011), it seems clear that Yemen is, at least, close to a state of civil war,
a non-international armed conflict.·' In Syria also, the intensity of violence would
seem to cross the threshold, but the lack of organization of the opposition forces
may be considered to rule out the existence of an "armed conflict" due to the difficulty in identifying an opposition "party" to that armed conflict.66 Certainly, military forces have been deployed within Syria, but does that automatically lead to an
"armed conflict" bringing into force the laws of armed conflict? I would argue that
the actions of the military forces, in such a context, will be judged under human
rights law-crimes against humanity-rather than under the laws of armed conflict as war crimes.
Bahrain also raises similar issues. Military forces have been deployed, including
troops from neighboring Saudi Arabia, but I would argue that the situation there
has not yet developed into an armed conflict.· 7
But does this matter? Is the distinction a matter of practical importance on the
ground or is it simply another example of lawyers debating how many angels can
dance on the head of a pin? In my opinion, resolution of this issue is hugely significant, as it illustrates the coming together of the two tectonic plates, the laws of
armed conflict and human rights law. Lawyers from each camp claim priority for
their legal regime, but can they all be right? A common tendency today is to dismiss
the argument by saying that the two systems are "complementary" and, therefore,
there is no underlying problem." I would suggest, however, that a closer examination does not support this "complementary" theory.
Insofar as ((Geneva" law is concerned, it can be accepted that there is a considerable degree of compatibility. Both systems oflaw grew from the same root, a need
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to protect those who were seen as victims. Although "Geneva" law was mainly designed, in the early days, to protect combatants who were placed Itors de combat and
human rights law was designed to protect civilians from the power of States, the
underlying principles are similar. While there may be differences of emphasisand, in places, of detail-these can be overcome and the two legal systems can sit
reasonably comfortably together.
"Hague" law on the conduct of hostilities is different in origin. It grew from the
acceptance of State entities' right to use violence. While "Hague" law sought to restrain that use of violence, it did not seek to prevent it and, therefore, acknowledged that, in time of war, people (including civilians) will die and things will get
broken. It is here that the laws of armed conflict begin to diverge from human
rights law, which starts with the rights of the individual and limits the occasions on
which States can override those rights. The two systems therefore approach matters
from opposite ends of the philosophical spectrum.
Insofar as "Hague" law seeks to limit the conduct of States, again there is a degree of compatibility with human rights law. Thus, many of the "protection" provisions and weaponry restrictions sit happily alongside human rights law.
However, it is in the "authorizations" accepted by "Hague" law that the greatest
difficulty lies. For centuries it was accepted that the right to use force was an inherent power of sovereignty. Those authorized by the sovereign were immune from
prosecution for acts of violence that would be criminal if committed outside the
context of war. This became known as "combatant immunity."" In return, such
belligerents were themselves lawful targets and could be killed without question
simply because of their status. The threat they posed was irrelevant. This customary
rule became tempered over time by custom itself, which developed the principle of
protection, which subsequently developed into "Geneva" treaty law, affording
protection to a belligerent who was rendered hors de combat; but the underlying
principle that a belligerent was a legitimate target was unchallenged.
Belligerents who were captured could be detained until the end of active hostilities.'· They were not criminals; just as it was accepted that belligerents could be
killed because of their status, so they could be detained for the same reason. Again
this was mitigated to allow for the early release of those seriously injured," but the
general principle remained. Early release was the exception, not the rule.
Human rights law approaches both the use of force and detention from the opposite direction. Use oflethal force is prohibited except in certain specified circumstances." Authority to use force is based on the threat posed by the individual on
whom the force is to be used. The right to life is a fundamental right and thus lethal
force is obviously a last resort. It may only be resorted to in the most extreme
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circumstances. These provisions will be well understood by anyone engaged in law
enforcement.
Similarly, the rigbt to liberty of the person may only be restricted in specific circumstances." Again, this would be assessed on an individual basis and the assessment would be based on threat. It would not indude the mass detention of
prisoners of war on the basis of status.
It follows that the tests involved for both use of force and detention are fundamentally different under human rights law and the laws of armed conflict. Let us
take the example of Bin Laden, leaving aside for these purposes issues of the ad
bellum authority for the operation being conducted in Pakistan.
It is the U.S. position that this operation was conducted as part of its ongoing
"war" against AI Qaeda, that Osama Bin Laden was a "belligerent" within that
armed conflict and therefore a legitimate target. 74 On that basis, under traditional
"Hague" rules, lethal force could be used against Bin Laden because of his status. It
was not necessary that he pose any threat to the attacking forces at the time that the
lethal force was used. Of course, the essential hOTS de combat rules would have applied
and, if Bin Laden had sought to surrender, then that surrender should have been
accepted. However, the burden was on Bin Laden to display a dear intention to
surrender, not on the troops themselves to inquire as to his intentions. There may
have been orders to capture Bin Laden, if possible, but this would have been a matter of operational requirements, not intemationallaw.
On the other hand, if this was a law enforcement operation conducted under
human rigbts law, then the primary aim of the operation would have to have been
to capture Bin Laden. Any use of force would have needed to be directly responsive
to the threats posed to the troops on the ground in the circumstances ruling at the
time. Any use oflethal force in particular would have needed to be justified specifically on the basis of the threat faced at the moment that the lethal force was used
and not simply by the fact that this was Osama Bin Laden. The burden would have
been on the troops to justify their use of force, not on Bin Laden himself.
As the example of the Iranian Embassy siege shows, the end results may be little
different. In a case where hostages have been killed and there remains a serious risk
to other hostages, as well as to the troops themselves, from well-armed terrorists
who have wired a building with explosives, little justification is needed for the
immediate use ofiethaJ force. However, the aim of the operation is different. Put
simply, it is the difference between "kill or capture" and "capture or kill."
While on many occasions, and it may well be that the Bin Laden case is an example, the results may be the same under either a law enforcement or armed conflict
operation, there will be others where the results may differ. An example is the
Bankovic case referred to earlier. 75 In that case, during the Kosovo air campaign,
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NATO aircraft attacked the main television station in Belgrade, causing a number
of civilian casualties. The families of the deceased and some of the injured initiated
proceedings against the European NATO States, alleging breaches of their right to
life. As earlier stated, the case fell at the admissibility hurdle when it was ruled that
the "victims" did not fall within the jurisdiction of the European States. This meant
that the case did not reach the merits stage. Had it done so, the applicants would
have argued that the TV station was not a legitimate military objective under the
laws of armed conflict, which would have resulted in the ECtHR being faced with
the dilemma of deciding whether the loose language of Article 52(2) of Additional
Protocol 176 is consistent with the strict standards on the use of force under human
rights law. Furthermore, even if the Court had decided that the TV station was a
military objective and therefore liable to attack, the Court might have then had to
rule on the issue of proportionality.
In cases involving the right of an individual to be free from torture and cruel or
inhumane treatment, the ECtHR has already ruled in deportation cases that a State
cannot set against the rights of the applicant the danger that the applicant poses to
national security, and thus to the rights of the wider population. n With this precedent, it would have been interesting to see how the Court dealt with the balance between the anticipated collateral damage and the anticipated military advantage.
Nor is this a theoretical problem. Cases have been filed with the ECtHR arising
from the Russia-Georgia conflict in 2008.'8 It therefore is likely that the Court will
have to deal with these issues within the foreseeable future. To date, the Court has
shown a marked reluctance to consider the laws of armed conflict, preferring to approach matters from a human rights perspective, occasionally paying lip service to
law of armed conflict principles. This can be seen at its most extreme in the
Chechnya cases, where the Court held in one case that where there was no derogation the Court was bound to consider matters on the basis of a normal law enforcement paradigm." That case involved air operations, and so it seemed that the
Court was taking a purely legalistic approach, refusing to accept the actual facts on
the ground. A similar approach to the Russia-Georgia conflict would involve, at
best, the interpretation oflaw of conflict principles through a human rights prism
and, at worst, a claim that human rights law trumps the law of armed conflict, even
in international armed conflict.
If, as seems likely, we are heading for a clash between the competing philosophies of "Hague" law and human rights law, is there any way of avoiding such a
clash while retaining the key principles of each? One way would be to seek to incorporate human rights standards into the laws of armed conflict. The JCRC seems to
have encouraged this approach in its Interpretive Guidance on the Notion ofDirect
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Participation in Hostilities undeT International Humanitarian Law.so In one of the
more controversial parts of this document, the ICRC states in Part IX;
In addition to the restraints imposed by international humanitarian law on specific
means and methods of warfare and without prejudice to further restrictions that may
arise under other applicable branches of international law, the kind and degree of force
which is permissible against persons not entitled to protection against direct attack
must not exceed what is actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose
in the prevailing circumstances.81

Despite its careful wording, this has been seen as incorporating a requirement
for a graduated use of force. Indeed, it claims to be an interpretation of a statement
by Jean Pictet:
Ifwe can put a soldier out of action by capturing him, we should not wound him; ifwe
can obtain the same result by wounding him, we must not kill him. If there are two
means to achieve the same military advantage. we must choose the one which causes
the lesser evil.82

While this is entirely consistent with the underlying philosophy of "Geneva" law, it
runs counter to the recognized interpretation of "Hague" law in which belligerents
are targetable with lethal force at all times because of their status. As such, this part
of the InteTpretive Guidance has been criticized by States, particularly those involved in major operations, as an attempt to rewrite existing law in a manner that,
when applied to all forms of armed conflict, would be unrealistic on the ground.
Another possible way forward would depend on an acceptance that the complementary view is not the answer and that there will be circumstances where the two
legal systems conflict. In such cases, it will be necessary to decide which legal system
should have priority. This would not affect the basic principle that there is sizable
overlap, but would seek to malee operational the Delphic dictum of the International Court of) ustice, when it sought to deal with the relationship between the
two bodies of law. It stated:
As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights
law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of
international hwnanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of hwnan rights
laWj yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law. In order to
answer the question put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration both these
branches of international law, namely human rights law and, as lex speoa/is, international humanitarian law.s3
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But where should the division be? It would seem clear that in international
armed conflict, priority should go to the laws of armed conflict. In cases falling
short of armed conflict, the laws of armed conflict do not apply at all and so human
rights law will govern. However, the situation is not so simple in relation to noninternational armed conflict or, within the sphere of international armed conflict,
situations of occupation. In each of these situations, as we have seen, the boundaries between law enforcement operations and armed conflict are blurred and difficult to define. The answer may be not to look at the technical classification of the
armed conflict but at the level ofviolence within it. Some non-international armed
conflicts are low-level, consisting principally of individual incidents rather than
concerted operations. To permit "Hague" law authorizations to apply to such
armed conflicts would encourage every despot to declare his internal disturbances
to be an armed conflict in order to permit wider powers of detention and use of
force. In low-level non-international armed conflicts of this nature, human rights
law should take priority when there is a conflict between human rights law and the
laws of armed conflict.
Other non-international armed conflicts are of very high intensity, equivalent
to that of an international armed conflict. In the past, these often led to "recognition of belligerency" and the application of the law relevant to international
armed conflict. However, as "recognition of belligerency" has fallen away in
recent decades, the level of intensity to be found has certainly not The Sri Lankan
civil war is a good example." To require militaries to comply with a law enforcement paradigm in relation to the use of force in such circumstances would be close
to suicidal. In cases of such intensity, the laws of armed conflict would prevail.
A similar test could be applied to situations of occupation. Where resistance is
comparatively low-key and consists primarily of individual attacks, however effective, human rights law would normally have priority. On the other hand, whereas, for example, in Iraq85-the resistance was of high intensity, the laws of armed
conflict would take priority.
This will not be a complete resolution of the problem in that there will still be
"gray" areas where authorities will need to make "good faith " decisions. In fact, this
reflects what already happens with respect to rules of engagement. Even in international armed conflict, there will be occasions when, whatever the circumstances
under the laws of armed conflict, soldiers have already been restricted in their use
of force by rules of engagement that have been imposed for political or other
reasons.
However, what is not acceptable is for the current position to continue, where
service personnel may find their actions subject to ex post facto investigation, an investigation which starts with uncertainty over the underlying legal regime. This is
III
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neither fair to the personnel themselves nor conducive to respect for the law. There
must be a better way!
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